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Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1972, 16 (3), 319-340.

Also reprinted as Chapter 44 in: J.J. Ray (Ed.) "Conservatism as Heresy". Sydney: A.N.Z. Book Co., 1974



School of Sociology, University of New South Wales


There is no doubt that of all psychological dispositions one often sees as opposed to the goals of conflict resolution and international amity is militarism. In this context the attempts by Eckhardt and his colleagues to introduce objective measures of militarism are of no small importance (see Eckhardt et al., 1967). This work is extended in Eckhardt and Newcombe (1969), where an attempt is made to relate militarism to personality type and other attitudes. To some extent the 1969 work suffers from overgeneralization, inadequate sampling, and insufficient methodological caution. The attempt to base a study of the militaristic personality on 46 participants at a Quaker seminar is little short of bizarre! One might as well study pacifism using a sample of generals from the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. Eckhardt and Newcombe also purport to draw conclusions about psychopathology without including in their test battery a single scale specifically designed to measure any type of psychopathology. The best they can do is to repeat tired inferences a la Adorno et al. (1950) which have not subsequently been well supported (e.g. Elms, 1970; Masling, 1954; Schoenberger, 1968; and summaries by Titus and Hollander, 1957; Christie and Cook, 1958; and Kirscht and Dillehay, 1967). At the risk of seeming to flog a dead horse it might also be observed that the authors seem oblivious of the serious methodological criticisms that have been directed at the measuring instruments they did use. Couch and Keniston (1960) have with many others questioned the validity of the F and D scales because of their susceptibility to acquiescent response set and the Eysenck T scale has been attacked as nonunidimensional by Rokeach and Hanley (1956) and Christie (1956). The authors could at least have made some allowance for acquiescent set. Use of the Berkowitz and Wolkon (1964) revision of the F scale might have been considered.

In spite of the above flaws however it is felt that Eckhardt and Newcombe do raise issues that warrant a more adequate test. The work reported below is an attempt to cover similar ground in a more rigorous way. Three consecutive empirical studies are reported. The first takes the fairly obvious first step of correlating existing measures of authoritarianism and related orientations with existing measures of psychopathology, using university students as subjects. In the second the relationship of authoritarian cum militaristic attitudes to actual authoritarian behavior is examined -- to escape demonstrably false assumptions (see Ray, 1971c) that one provides an a priori basis for inferences about the other. In the third study, new measures of militarism and personal adjustment are developed that enable more satisfactory methodological controls than has heretofore been the case. These are applied to a sample of army conscripts that also offers advantages in generalizability of findings. It will be shown that all three approaches lead to mutually reinforcing conclusions.

Study I -- Student Attitudes


In this study the sample consisted of 262 students (day and evening) in the introductory psychology course at Macquarie University, Australia. This sample is still far from ideal for a study of authoritarianism but the presence of some authoritarian tendencies among the subjects is not an unreasonable expectation. In fact Hitler had no want of support among the German students of his day.

All subjects completed questionnaires designed to measure psychopathology, authoritarianism, and related tendencies, political orientation (conservatism, voting preference), and demographic factors. The first part of the study focused on the relationship between authoritarian tendencies and psychopathology. The psychopathology measure used was the neuroticism scale from the Eysenck Personality Inventory. This was chosen because of Eysenck and Eysenck's (1969) demonstration that it constitutes the most important single factor of personality disturbance that can be extracted from personality inventories. A 33-item alienation scale was also included. At the time this study was designed, Eckhardt's militarism scale was unfortunately not available to the present author. Scales were included however to measure authoritarianism (F), dogmatism (D), and ethriocentrism (E). In view of the reported high correlation (.61) between the F scale and the militarism scale the omission is perhaps not a serious one. To replace the militarism scale the F scale was modified in the direction of militarism by using only those items having most direct reference to authority and omitting items expressing superstition, projectivity, etc. (cf. French and Ernest, 1955; Prothro and Melikian, 1953). The E scale used consisted of the ten strongest items (five positive, five negative) from Beswick and Hills' (1969) Australian ethnocentrism scale. The dogmatism scale was the Australian version produced by Anderson and Western (1967). Also included was Melvin's revision of the Eysenck (1954) R scale (radicalism-conservatism). An acquiescence score was also computed for each person by summing the "agree" responses across a set of 28 positive (conservative) and 28 negative (liberal) items. Thus, if necessary, the influence of acquiescent response set could be partialled out from the correlation matrix. The reliability (coefficient alpha) of this acquiescence "scale" was .69.

The second part of the study was motivated by Eckhardt and Newcombe's attempt (1969, p. 216) to generalize personality pathology to conservatism in general -- as well as to militarism and authoritarianism. To examine this hypothesis two conservatism scales were used. The first was a revision (see Ray, 1971d) of the Wilson and Patterson (1960) C scale. This is a scale in a new short-item format purported to have intrinsically higher validity (see Appendix A for the items). The second general conservatism scale overlapped considerably in item content with the battery of F, R, E, and D scales mentioned above. It was hence in conventional item format and consisted of 12 positive and 12 negative items (see Appendix B). Both these scales had been normed on samples of Australian army conscripts where their reliabilities had been .84 and .70 respectively. Further details of each scale's validity and other characteristics can be found in Ray (1971d). Voting preference was scored 5 (Democratic Labor Party), 4 (Liberal-Country Party), 3 (no preference), 2 (Australian Labor Party), 1 (Communist). These are Australian political parties from most right-wing to most left-wing.


The results for the first part of this study are given in Table 1.




Ethnocentrism (E)...........1.00.... .26.... .44...... .58.......-.14.....-.05.....-.19
Dogmatism (D).........................1.00..... .49...... .29.......-.21.....-.02.....-.19
Authoritarianism (F)............................1.00....... .62.......-.08..... .04..... .02
Radicalism-conservatism (R)...........................1.00.......-.16.....-.06.....-.27
Acquiescence................................................................1.00.... .10...... .03
Neuroticism..............................................................................1.00..... .40

It will be seen that the authoritarian subject was not more neurotic; some authoritarians were neurotic, some were not. Over all there was no relationship. It was perhaps the subset who were neurotic that Adorno et al. (1950) selectively described in their interviews and projective tests (see also Masling, 1954).

It will also be seen that acquiescence did not have any substantial systematic effect on the scores of any scale. The single noteworthy relationship -- with dogmatism -- was also true of a balanced dogmatism scale (Ray, 1970). Therefore there was no need to partial out acquiescence scores.

Other findings of interest are that acquiescence itself was at least with this sample, not a neurotic symptom. The one significant relationship found with neuroticism (i.e. alienation) was to be expected (Hughes, 1968). Further discussion of this can be found in Ray and Sutton (1972).

The correlations may be interpreted using .12 as the critical value for significance at the .05 level (two-tailed). We used the contrastual error-rate approach (Binder, 1964; Rodger, 1967), because the number of contrasts in an experiment is arbitrary. If the experimental approach had been used, the decision-basis would vary arbitrarily from experiment to experiment. That hardly would be the stuff of science.

The results of the second part of this study are recorded in Table 2. It will be seen that the measures of conservatism, father's vote, or the student's own vote were not related to neuroticism. As expected, conservatives (as measured by the revised C scale) were also shown to be less alienated. The results here are in accord with Masling (1954) and the judicious summary by Eysenck (1954; p. 236) but conflict with the summary by Eckhardt and Newcombe (1969, p. 216).

The reliabilities of the two conservatism scales in this study were .87 for the revised C scale and .78 for the general conservatism scale. For all scales the students tended to score on the "radical" side of the midpoint.

Study, II -- Student Behavior


In this study an attempt was made to look at the relationship between militaristic attitudes and actual behavior of an antisocial and particularly of an authoritarian nature. The attitude scale used was a 28-item balanced "attitude to authority" scale (see Appendix C for the items). Eight of these items specifically mentioned the army. This scale had also been normed on a sample of conscripts, and there showed a reliability of .83. A full report of its rationale, validity, and factorial structure can be found in Ray (1971b).

Measures of actual behavior were sought by obtaining peer and teacher ratings. This is the method favored by Hollander (1957) and Titus (1968). The first sample consisted of 57 fifth-form students in a local boys' high-school who were rated by a committee of three teachers who knew them. For each student six ratings were completed. The second sample was a group of 55 second-year students in a social psychology class at Macquarie University. This group rated one another on a list of nine characteristics. Each subject was handed two rating sheets and instructed to write his identification number on each. Subjects were then told to give one of the sheets to each of "the two people in this room who know you best." The mean rating of the two judges was the one entered into the correlation matrix. Items l, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 13 of the AA scale were not used in the school student sample because of their unsatisfactory correlation with the scale total. This left a balanced scale of 20 items -- 8 of which referred to the Army directly (see Ray, 1971b).




....................................Sex....F Ed....S Vote..F Vote....C .....Ali......N........Rev C

Sex..............................1.00.... .03...... .10..... -.02....-.06....-.08..... .08..... .08
Father's. education................1.00..... -.01...... .13... -.00.... .06..... .08..... .07
Subject's vote....................................1.00....... .40... .31.... -.27..... .07..... .35
Father's vote..................................................1.00... .19.... -.15..... -.05..... .24
Conservatism (C).....................................................1.00... -.12..... -.02..... .47
Alienation............................................................................1.00..... .40......-.32
Neuroticism....................................................................................1.00..... -.01
Revised C scale.........................................................................................1.00

The teacher ratings used are given in Table 3 -- with the correlations of each with attitude to authority.



[a] Raters were instructed on the rating sheet to assign numbers to each item according to the following scale: 7 for "very true," 5 for "more true than false," 4 for "not sure," 3 for "more false than true," 2 for "false," and 1 for "very false."

[b] For AA scale see Appendix C.

1. Tends to follow instruction without critical thought .31
2. Likes to push others around .07
3. Is inclined to trust the motives of others .27
4. Does not have to be told what to do all the time -.07
5. Is a submissive person toward his teachers .36
6. Is an aggressive person toward his fellow students .05

It is clear that the picture which emerges is that those with positive attitudes toward authority are submissive rather than anti-social, domineering, or aggressive. This is in fact an eminently reasonable state of affairs. Submitting to authority and approving of it should go together. It takes rather devious reasoning (cf. Adorno et al., 1950) to convince us that a person approving of authority is an aggressive disturbed person (see Martin and Ray, 1972). It is in any case clear from these results that everyday behavior which is normally now called authoritarian and attitudes which are called authoritarian cannot be shown to go together.


The data obtained from the university students were even less conducive to the assumption made by previous writers that authoritarian attitudes and authoritarian behavior go together. Of the nine ratings in Table 4, none showed a significant (p <.05 when r > .221) relationship to scores on the AA scale. The fact that the relationship with submissiveness reported in the school sample did not materialize here, may be connected with the greater sophistication of these students both as respondents to the questionnaire and as raters.



{Same rating scale and AA scale as in Table 3}

1. Tends to follow instructions without critical thought .09
2. Likes to push others around .10
3. Is inclined to trust the motives of others -.14
4. Does not have to be told what to do all the time .12
5. Is a submissive person under pressure .15
6. Is an aggressive person toward his fellow students .01
7. Is inclined to be overbearing .18
8. Is characterized by fixed opinions -.07
9. Is authoritarian .03

Students in the 1970 sample had been given very extensive work on authoritarianism by the present author as part of their course and this had comprised all the usual references from Adorno et al. (1950) to Brown (1965) --references wherein the evaluation of authoritarianism was uniformly negative, though variable, in degree. This could well have distorted any favorable attitudes to authority on their own part and could have made them more reluctant to rate their peers accurately on what was manifestly a list of authoritarian attributes.

Students in the 1969 class (n = 40) however did not have this prior exposure to the authoritarianism concept and, among them, two ratings indicating submissiveness did correlate significantly with an early version of the AA scale. The rating "always modifies his behavior to fit the circumstances of the situation" correlated .469 (p <.01), and the rating "tends to follow instructions without critical thought" correlated .333 (p < .01). The ratings "is characterized by fixed opinions" and "likes to push others around" did not correlate significantly with authoritarian attitudes.

Overall then, both the university student peer-rating data and the teacher-rating data presented here support the conclusions from a similar study by Titus (1968): that there has so far been no positive evidence of an overall relationship between authoritarian attitudes and basic authoritarian behavior. (See Ray, 1971c, for a discussion of a similar conclusion in relation to ethnocentrism.)

Note that although Masling, Greer, and Gilmore (1955) reported a similar study wherein significant relationships between peer sociometric choice and a military authoritarianism scale was found, the highest correlation (see their Table 2) was in fact .08. Because of the very large sample this was significant; but with less than 0.01 percent of the common variance explained, this is for all intents and purposes a report of no relationship.

Study III -- Militarism Among Army Conscripts


This study [1] employed a sample of 96 Australian Army "National Servicemen" (conscripts). National Servicemen are selected at random from the entire 20-year-old male population by a birth-date ballot procedure. There is no geographical bias and noncitizens are equally liable. Students may have their liability deferred but are not exempted. Conscripts therefore make an excellent sample for social research where wide generalizability of the results for the male population is desired.

In this study it was hoped to learn something of the social characteristics of the militarist. To this end scales measuring social adaptability, other-directedness, and alienation were included in a battery which totaled 338 items. Of these 80 items formed the draft of a new militarism scale. It was felt that a new scale was called for to take account (and to take advantage) of the particular situation of our respondents as involuntary members of a military organization. Otherwise the ideal characteristics of a militarism scale were taken to be threefold: (1) high reliability demonstrated on a general male population sample; (2) complete balance against acquiescent response set; and (3) the items used eschew such content areas as nationalism, conservatism, lack of peace responsibility, and anti-Communism. Such constructs it was felt should be reserved for the role of possible empirical correlates. As measured here then, militarism was taken to mean liking and admiration for the Army, its principles, and those things characteristic of it (cf. Encel, 1967). Short dogmatism.and ethnocentrism scales similar to those used in Study I were also included -- as was the AA scale used in Study II.

The social adaptability scale mentioned above was meant to take the place of the neuroticism inventory in Study 1. This scale was used instead of the N scale because of the one-sided nature of the N scale, which inevitably confounds acquiescence and neuroticism. Fortunately with the sample used in the first study acquiescence could be demonstrated to have negligible effect. Partialling out however cannot restore discriminating power which is not there in the first place. The very presence of negative items in a battery forces a respondent to give more thought to what he is answering. For this reason the social adaptability scale was written as a completely balanced instrument from the beginning. Its conceptualization was similar to that of neuroticism but its focus (on social interaction) was more narrow.

This concern with acquiescent set is more than a matter of methodological elegance. One of the central requirements of successful adaptation to a military milieu would seem to be acquiescence of some form. Therefore it seems quite possible that the relationships between militarism and neuroticism summarized by Eckhardt and Newcombe were due to the acquiescence component in the N scale score rather than the neuroticism component per se.

In this study, only the two main scales were completely balanced. The other scales -- of political alienation, other directedness, etc. were of indicative interest only, i.e., they were primarily intended as sources of hypotheses rather than as definitive tests.

The questionnaire was administered by Army personnel but it was made clear that the questionnaire was "part of a research project for a student at the University of Sydney" and that confidentiality would be maintained. Since all Army questionnaires are printed but this one was roughly mimeographed and headed "University of Sydney, Department of Government," this should have been sufficient to ensure frankness (but see below).

If then there is anything in Eckhardt and Newcombe's characterization of the militarist as an inflexible paranoid deviant, we should be able to hypothesize for this study a substantial negative correlation between the social adaptability and militarism scales.

A second major goal of this study was to see how close after all was conservatism rigorously defined to militarism rigorously defined. To this end a draft conservatism scale was prepared which eschewed reference to "leaders" and other items which might give an artifactual relationship with militarism -- instead, it concentrated on traditional and indubitable radical-conservative issues, such as opposition to innovation and redistribution of the wealth. Because the issue of student revolt has tended to polarize on clear right-wing-left-wing lines, some items derived from this were also included in the draft.


The militarism, social adaptability, and other directedness scales constructed for this study proved quite successful. Reliabilities (Cronbach's, 1951, coefficient "alpha") were .94, .80, and .86 respectively. See Appendices D-F for the final versions. The first two were completely balanced, but the third was only partly so.

The most disappointing result was with the conservatism scale. Out of 31 "liberal" items included in the original 63 item proto-scale, practically every one correlated positively with the conservatism items -- not negatively as expected. This made it impossible to construct a balanced instrument along the lines originally envisaged. Since the structure of conservative attitudes appeared to be other than what one might theoretically expect, a necessary, step appeared to be an empirical analysis of the attitude structure in this domain. To this end the 63 conservatism items were subjected to a cluster analysis. Cluster analysis (McQuitty, 1961) was chosen because it is a completely objective method which unlike factor analysis requires no arbitrary decisions about parameter size or factor structure. Thirteen clusters emerged. Of these only the seventh was at all balanced. It contained four positive and three negative items and showed a reliability (coefficient "alpha") of .60. Although this reliability is quite high for an empirical cluster, it is low for a scale. Nonetheless It is high enough to assure us that we are measuring a general trait. The critical level of significance for alpha (see Hoyt, 1941) was .30 at the .01 level. To maximize reliability however the cluster was subjected to item-analysis. This resulted in the dropping of one item to produce a balanced six-item scale with a reliability of .62 (see Appendix G).



....................................Milit... SAdap...Eth.....Ali.......D.....OD.....AA.....C.....Res AA

Militarism....................1.00...... .22.... -.29... -.47....-.08... .01.... .83.... .24..... .69
Social adaptability..................1.00..... -.33... -.36....-.27..-.44.... .22.... .31..... .21
Ethnocentrism.....................................1.00.... .36.... .16.. .24....-.32.... .30.....-.23
Political alienation.........................................1.00.... .30.. .32....-.56....-.48.....-.55
Dogmatism (D)........................................................1.00.. .41....-.15....-.16.....-.21
Other directedness..........................................................1.00....-.02....-.29.....-.00
Attitude to authority (AA)............................................................1.00.... .24..... .94
Conservatism.......................................................................................1.00..... .22
Residual AA....................................................................................................1.00

The correlations between all variables are given in Table 5. Correlations above .17 are significant at the .05 level. Because seven AA scale items (four negative, three positive) overlapped with the militarism scale, a residual AA score was also found on the nonoverlapping AA items alone. The reliability (alpha) of this residual AA scale was .75.

Note that as expected conservatism was positively related to ethnocentrism, militarism, and attitude to authority.

The correlations were however quite low, and while ethnocentrism was negatively related to social adaptability, three scales -- conservatism, authoritarianism, and militarism --- were all significantly positively related. This means that the militarist, far from being maladjusted (as Eckhardt and Newcombe believe) is in fact better adjusted than normal.

In view of the methodological strengths of this study it is believed that these results represent an important advance in knowledge and tend to invalidate previous studies of contrary conclusions. The methodological advantages over most previous studies in the California tradition may be summarized as: (1) The use of general male population sampling; (2) The absence of any "volunteer artifact" such as that which plagues door-to-door studies; (3) The absence of experimenter bias in selecting "cases" to be described (an important defect in the case-study method used by Adorno et al., 1950); (4) The use of balanced scales in both the personality and attitude measurement applications; and (5) The greater precision in definition of major concepts.


In Study I no measure of right-wing ideology related to scores on the Eysenck neuroticism scale. This lack of relationship is important because of the factorial primacy of this scale and also because it is a scale that has amply demonstrated discriminating power between psychiatric patients and normals (i.e. predictive validity). Adorno et al. (1950) claimed that the authoritarian was psychologically "sick" and, in spite of many failures to confirm this assertion (e.g., Masling, 1954, and others -- see the review by Kirscht and Dillehay, 1967), there have been some apparent successes (see Eckhardt and Newcombe, 1969) and many psychologists still appear to accept it. The present study is however notable because of the variety of right-wing ideology measures employed and in particular the attention given to eliminating and controlling for acquiescent response set. An inspection of the "general conservatism" scale used in this study will reveal that it is in fact very much a "balanced F scale" -- which has been long sought but has been rather elusive of attainment (Christie, Havel, and Seidenberg, 1956). Items that cannot be traced directly to the F scale are at least very similar to it in tone and content. (The correlation between its two halves for this sample was --.441). If then authoritarians are "sick," it is In some special sense of "sick" that may amount to little more than a value judgment. Also compare here the results from a rather complementary study by Elms (1970). Just as the present study used a variety of ideological measures, Elms used a variety of clinical measures on an indisputably rightist subject population. He also found no evidence of psychopathology among rightists. Even so it did seem worthwhile to keep looking for some special sense in which the authoritarian might after all be sick, and the social adaptability construct did seem a good candidate here. For this reason a scale to measure this was employed in Study III.

Study II was of course really three separate experiments -- all concerned with various types of antisocial behavior that are often referred to as "authoritarian." The "ratings by others" technique was employed in order to get an independent overall assessment of the person's attributes. It is one widely used in industry and in industrial psychology for this purpose. It has the effect of regarding the rater as an accumulating data-bank about the subject. From observing many individual acts the rater is able to make an overall generalization about how the subject does in fact behave. This does seem rather more important data than one or two isolated acts in a thoroughly manipulated and highly atypical experimental setting, if only because the generalization possibilities offered by those experimental settings must often of necessity be trivially small. Such experiments are useful for many purposes but making overall generalizations about the character of authoritarians would not seem to be one of them.

It is therefore highly noteworthy that the present three rating experiments (in Study II) accord perfectly with the two prior such experiments in the literature (Titus, 1968; Masling, Greer and Gilmore, 1955) in finding no relationship between authoritarian behavior and authoritarian attitudes. Over all five experiments a total of three different scales were used to measure authoritarian attitudes. There was also a wide variety of subjects -- university students in the arts and engineering, high school students, and army recruits. We must therefore conclude that in everyday life those behaviors called authoritarian and those attitudes called authoritarian do not go together.

This means that authoritarian attitudes and authoritarian behavior must be studied as separate phenomena. Even if those persons possessing authoritarian attitudes were sick, it would not mean that people of authoritarian behavior were sick.

The Study II results taken in conjunction with the work by La Piere (1934) do suggest a reinterpretation of the supposedly anti Semitic cliche -- "Some of my best friends are Jewish." (What the pro-Semite is supposed to say we are never told.) Since we have seen that there is little relationship between attitudes and behavior in this field, it appears that possibly it may be in fact simply a true statement for a person with prejudiced attitudes to report that he gets on well with some people who are Jewish. His avowed attitudes and his interpersonal behavior are simply not correlated. Some people with prejudiced attitudes will not be friendly towards Jews and some will; some people with unprejudiced attitudes will not be friendly towards Jews and some will. The fact that a statement so evidently pro-Semitic has become paradoxically associated with anti-Semitism is in fact good evidence that the rather startling phenomena of attitude-behavior orthogonality have been with us for a long time. Under the influence of Adorno et al., social scientists have simply been slow to recognize it. It is suggested then that the rather striking subset of ethnically, prejudiced people who are in fact friendly towards Jews has supported the popular association between prejudiced attitudes and the statement, "Some of my best friends are Jews."

A possible explanation for the orthogonality between antisocial behavior and attitudes in La Pierre (1934), Titus (1968), and the present work might be that some people who acknowledge affect-positive reactions to antisocial behavior make a deliberate effort to correct against the (maladaptive) possibility of their actually behaving that way. On the other hand there would be some people who do not acknowledge their antisocial impulses. These would show up as people with unprejudiced or nonauthoritarian attitudes. Since they do not acknowledge their affect-positive reactions to antisocial behavior, they in fact make no effort to suppress such behavior. The outcome would be that we have some people with malevolent attitudes who behave benevolently and some people with benevolent attitudes who behave malevolently. The other two quadrants of this matrix contain the people with consistent behavior and attitudes. Therefore there would be no relationship between attitudes and behavior: all possibilities are open. This theory does have the interesting corollary that people of authoritarian attitudes would be most likely to translate their attitudes into behavior when the possibilities of aversive feedback from the behavior are minimal. This would explain the usual correlation between such attitudes and political voting preference. Our attitudes may be translated into the action of voting under the protection of the secret ballot.

A second corollary of the above theory is that the person who is most likely to be psychologically sick is the person with an egalitarian ideology who behaves in an authoritarian way (for example perhaps V. I. Lenin).

We have a slightly humorous exemplification of this sort of inconsistency in a quotation coming from an age before ethnocentrism had generally come to be seen as morally outrageous [2]:

"The doctrine my friends, which must prevail in the future is the brotherhood of man. We are all brothers, my fellow workers, and all equal. Yes, even the Chinaman. But I confess I would rather wear my shirt six months than let a Chow wash it".

In this quotation we have the two types of statements that we now know so well as making up attitude scales and personality inventories respectively. First there is the statement of attitude or ideology ("We are all brothers"), then there is the report of actual behavior (he does not let Chinamen do his washing). Examples as clearcut as this will not be so easily found nowadays. The malevolent behavior will neither be as overtly emitted nor as overtly acknowledged.

The picture of the militarist presented in Study III is closely in accord with what the present writer knows of Australian Regular Army personnel (i.e., people who have voluntarily chosen the military life). They appear contemptuous of racial prejudice, believe strongly in our existing system of government, are quite often broad-minded, are submissive to legitimate authority (cf. Martin and Ray, 1972), and could not possibly survive the rigors of military life if they were not well-adjusted.

The implied identification of militarism and conservatism made by Eckhardt and Newcombe (1969) is also thrown sharply into question by the present results. One can argue of course whether a correlation of .24 is "high" or not according to taste. It is statistically significant, but at the same time far short of identity. A relationship this low does at least tally with the fact that not all dictatorial military governments on the world political scene are right-wing in ideology. What is perhaps more noteworthy however is that conservatives were shown here -- as in so many previous studies -- to be significantly racially prejudiced, while on the other hand militarists were just as significantly racially tolerant. It would take then singularly devious reasoning to identify these militarists with the unfortunate people interviewed by Adorno et al. (1950). Yet if militarists are not authoritarians, then who is? The very notion of "authoritarianism" proposed by Adorno et al. would now seem to be irretrievably fallacious, if only because of the evidence summarized so far in this paper. Note also from Table 5 that the attitude to authority scale is negatively related to ethnocentrism. This shows how different the AA scale is from the F scale (see also Ray, 1971b). The AA scale was deliberately constructed so as to avoid the charge leveled at the F scale that it measured conservatism as well as authoritarianism (Shils in Christie and Jahoda, 1954; Eysenck, 1954; Rokeach, 1960). The present work shows then that the correlations between ethnocentrism and the F scale previously observed were due to the conservatism component of that scale -- not the authoritarianism component.

Even so the finding of a negative relationship between authoritarianism and racial prejudice is not completely unprecedented. Perlmutter (1954) has recorded a finding that authoritarians are more "xenophilic." Note that Table 5 also provides some excellent validation of the concurrent type for the social adaptability scale. It is reasonable to expect that the person low on social adaptability should find the challenges of interacting with people of another race unwelcome (r = -.33) and also that he would be more alienated from the world around him (r = -.36). The relation between neuroticism and alienation is well known (Hughes, 1968; Ray and Sutton, 1972). The expected relationship between the social adaptability and other-directedness scales (r = -.44) is less clear on a priori grounds but it is at least true that Riesman (1950) believed other-directedness to be maladjustive.

A possible challenge that might be raised against the interpretation of the above results in terms of their ostensible meaning might be that the correlation between militarism and social adjustment was high because of a common social desirability response-set factor. It might be argued that it is socially desirable for conscripts to say that they like the army. This is very doubtful. As Owen Thompson writing in The Australian newspaper [3] reports, militarism in Australia is distinctly out of fashion. Only in talking to training battalion staff might we reasonably expect social desirability to elicit pro-army expressed attitudes from the conscripts. In view of the care taken to ensure anonymity, confidentiality, etc., such an effect would not seem to be operating. Even more direct evidence than this however is in fact possible. A quick look back at the scale items said to measure "other directedness" will reveal , that these same items could equally as well, perhaps better, be said to tap the need for approval. Since it is the "approval motive" which Crowne and Marlowe (1964) say underlies their social desirability scale, it will be evident that the other directedness scale given here could well be used as a rough substitute for a social desirability scale. If this is so, the correlation of .01 between the other-directedness and militarism scales shows that high militarism scores are not produced by social desirability responses.

Some time after Study III had been completed; a further body of data on 558 Australian National Servicemen came to hand [4]. In this data the same social adaptability scale was included plus other scales to measure alienation, egalitarianism, army traditionality, political authoritarianism, other-direction, and general conservatism. This latter scale was in fact the original version of Wilson and Patterson's C-scale. Unfortunately only the social adaptability and C scales were completely balanced. The correlations are however of interest and they do in general reinforce the conclusions already drawn. The correlations of the above list of scales with social adaptability were: alienation -.27; egalitarianism -.26; army traditionality .15; political authoritarianism .04; other direction -.28; and general conservatism -.02. Thus the significant negative correlations with alienation and other direction are maintained. Additionally egalitarians are shown to be significantly more poorly adjusted and traditionalists significantly better adjusted. The relationships with authoritarianism and general conservatism do drop however to nonsignificance. Since the "political authoritarianism" scale used in this study is a "mixed bag" of many sorts of items and since the original C scale does have severe problems (including a positive correlation of its supposedly "liberal" items with the conservatism -- items, see Ray, 1971a and 1971b), this failure to confirm need not detain us unduly. At least it is clear that the significantly negative relationship, that is certainly to be expected on the theory of Adorno et al. (1950), is not to be found.

As an interesting sidelight on the problems surrounding the structure of conservative attitudes, the correlation between the army traditionality and egalitarianism scales, was in fact significantly positive (.17). Because of this fact and because of their correlations with social adaptability, the items of these scales are given in Appendix H.

Summary and Conclusions

The social cohesiveness of ex-servicemen is well known. Even years after discharge, one never walks past a member of one's army unit in the street without stopping to exchange a few words. Ex-servicemen's clubs too are a perennial feature of most communities (e.g., the RSL in Australia). Evidence such as this is not easily explained by an account of the militarist as an anti-social paranoid deviant. If anything the picture is of a very socially oriented group, particularly towards others with whom they have shared experiences. Army mess life also places heavy emphasis on social life and adjustment. The sort of "social-learning deficit" that Eysenck and Rachman (1954) regard as central to neuroticism would in that environment lead to very early exclusion and rejection. Thus it is seen that the psychological evidence presented above merely serves to confirm what the most superficial sociological observation of military life and army men would serve to reveal. It may be true that other characteristics that army men share with conservatives in general -- such as their contempt for weakness, their respect for toughness and strength, and a certain practical orientation which makes them disregard the thinker's nuances -- are such as the radical and particularly the radical intellectual might find offensive. Such characteristics are in fact the probable source of labels like "intolerance of ambiguity," "rigidity," etc. What is now clear however is that these characteristics cannot be equated with personality pathology. This means that the value judgments to be made of militarism are not as easy as many would have liked to believe. It could well be argued for instance, that the militarist's desire to create order, far from representing a pathological "intolerance of ambiguity," is directly analogous to the scientists' desire to create order in the state of man's knowledge. The militarist creates order by creating laws of conduct for his fellows. The scientist creates order by discovering or formulating laws of nature. This might seem a rather bizarre comparison but it is thought that the basic point must be accepted: a desire for order is not necessarily pathological and need not be negatively evaluated. In the appropriate intellectual climate it may, indeed must, lead to creativity -- to the formulation of "systems and theories." The desire and ability to create order in one's environment is in fact one of the things that marks off man most strongly (though not entirely) from the lower animals.

It may of course be true that there is something rightly called "intolerance of ambiguity" which is independent of a desire for order. If so, it would be interesting to see evidence of it.

Rigidity too is a rather poor stick with which to beat the militarist. This has long been known to be situation-specific and the present study has tended to show that at least in social life the militarist is in fact more adaptable than normal.

It is felt then that the present work represents the conclusion in a chapter of social research wherein the work by Adorno et al. (1950) has been very thoroughly undone. Other contributions to this chapter have been by Elms (1970), Schoenberger (1968), Titus (1968), Rudin (1961), Masling (1954), Christie and Jahoda (1954), Eckhardt (1968), Eysenck (1954), Hynes (1956), Hollander (1954), Knopfelmacher and Armstrong (1963), Ray (1971b, 1971c, and I972b), and Martin and Ray (1972).

One must always wonder a little of course about studies (including the present one) using self-report inventories such as the neuroticism and social adaptability scales. Strictly speaking, the correlations discussed have only shown that people who say they favor the army also say they get on well socially, etc. Perhaps the principal reason why such self-report inventories do in fact show predictive validity is that it is easier and more "natural" to tell the truth than to devise a lie -- particularly under conditions where the motivation for lying is low. In any event this paper is one of the small minority in this field (see Rambo, 1970) that goes beyond the subjective self-report of the interviewee and seeks objective ratings of the interviewee by others (vide Study II). Neither Eckhardt and Newcombe (1969) nor Adorno et al. (1950) in fact do this, but Titus (1968), Hynes (1956), and Hollander (1954) do.

Thus the greatest lesson of the above results would seem to lie in the sociology of knowledge. They show that a false belief can come to be widely accepted as true, even if the evidence upon which it is based is fraught with methodological flaws. This happens where the false belief is satisfying to the believers or confirms their prejudices. Most social scientists would acknowledge at least vague "leftish" sympathies. Therefore a theory which shows people of an opposing ideology to be in some sense "sick" is both congenial and welcome. The more humble view that ideology enters where knowledge is difficult or impossible leads to the necessity of acknowledging that others have a valid right to hold opinions other than our own. This is not nearly as satisfying as stigmatizing those who disagree with us as "sick."

Humanitarian radical intellectuals might take at least one important consolation from this study: It is better to know one's adversary as he really is, rather than to underestimate him.

This study is not of course the last word in methodological sophistication, but if judged by the same standard applied to previous studies of opposite conclusions, it is believed that it survives the comparison exceedingly well. In summary then, far from being a dangerously maladjusted person, the militarist is shown to be among our better adjusted and less obnoxious citizens. This also seems to be true of conservatives in general. These conclusions are based on a failure of the Eysenck neuroticism scale to correlate with any measure of right-wing ideology, a zero relationship between an attitude to authority scale and actual authoritarian behavior, and a positive correlation between a social adjustment scale and other scales measuring militarism, attitude to authority, and conservatism.

The new militarism scale confirms the relationship between militarism and conservatism but shows it to be slight. An important difference between the militarist and the conservative is also revealed -- that the militarist is racially tolerant while the conservative is racially prejudiced.


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Evolution theory (R), Conventional clothes, Common decency, School uniforms, Apartheid, Legalized homosexuality (R), Striptease shows (R), Nudist camps (R), Pot smoking (R), Beatniks (R), Disarmament (R), Love-ins (R), Modern art (R), Censorship, Imperialism, Working mothers (R), White lies (R), Conformity, Birth control (R), Mixed marriage (R), The police, Military drill, Strict rules, Soviet Russia (R), Moral training, Jazz (R), Teetotaling, Suicide (R), Casual living (R), Defense spending, Chaperones, Divorce (R), Religion, Legalized abortion (R), Pajama parties (R), God, Empire building, Mercy killing (R), Authority, Student pranks (R), Protest marches (R), Political demonstrations (R), Licensing laws, Debutantes, Nationalism, Chastity, Law reform (R), My country, Royalty, Respect for parents

*This scale is a measure of general conservatism using short item format and normed on a sample of 111 Australian National Servicemen. Items are scored 3 for "yes," 2 for "?," and 1 for "no." Preamble as in Wilson and Patterson (1968). Items marked (R) are reverse scored. Reliability (alpha) is .84 for National Servicemen and .87 for first-year university students.



1. Allowing educated Asians to immigrate benefits Australian society (R).
2. Australia should aim at closer contact with Communist China (R).
3. The White-Australia policy is a good policy because it helps to keep Australia white.
4. We must be careful not to let too many Asians into the country or they'll take over the place.
5. People who hold Communist beliefs should not be allowed to hold high positions in the public service.
6. Asians should be allowed to migrate to Australia (R).
7. The Japanese are very productive people and should be allowed to settle in Australia (R).
8. Although many details still remain to be worked out, we now have definite answers to most practical problems in life.
9. Human beings are more important than efficiency (R)
10. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down.
11. Human life is sacred (R).
12. There is seldom any reason to hurt people's feelings (R).
13. Nobody ever learned anything really important except through suffering.
14. An insult to our honor should always be punished.
15. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped or worse.
16. All men are equal (R).
17. Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals and ought to be severely punished.
18. Most of our social problems would be solved if we could somehow get rid of the immoral, crooked, and feebleminded people.
19. People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong.
20. Individual freedom is a basic human right (R).
21. Crimes of violence should be punished by flogging.
22. The death penalty is barbaric, and should be abolished (R).
23. It is wrong to punish a man if he helps another country, because he prefers it to his own (R).
24. Our treatment of criminals is too harsh, we should try to cure them, not punish them (R).

*In this scale alpha = .70 on the norming sample of 404 conscripts and .78 on 262 university students. Response options are 5 for "strongly agree," 4 for "agree," 3 for "not sure," 2 for "disagree," and 1 for "strongly disagree." Items marked (R) are reverse scored.



Subset 1. View of leader: executive vs. decision maker

1. If there is a disagreement about a policy, a leader should be willing to give it up (R).
2. A leader should always change his actions to ensure agreement and harmony in the community (R).
3. It is important for a leader to get things done even if he must displease people by doing them.
4. A national leader should follow the wishes of the community, even if he thinks the citizens are mistaken (R).
5. If a leader is himself sure of what is the best thing to do, he must try to do this, even though he has to use some pressure on the people.
6. It is all right for a leader to do something unauthorized, if he is sure it will be for the good of the people in the long run.
7. It is most important to have the participation of everybody in making decisions, regardless of their knowledge of the issues involved (R).
8. It's always better to try to talk people into doing things, rather than give them straight out orders (R).

Subset 2. Evaluation of authoritarian institutions and other examples of the exercise of authority.

9. There's generally a good reason for every rule and regulation in public service departments.
10. In the Army soldiers should not obey an order if it is obviously morally wrong (R).
11. If the Army allowed more room for individuality, it might be a better institution (R).
12. There is something wrong with anybody who likes to wear military uniform (R).
13. When the dictator Mussolini made Italy's trains run on time, that at least was an thing to achieve.
14. Two years in the Army would do everyone the world of good.
15. The Army is very good for straightening men out and smartening them up.
16. Civilians could learn a lot from the Army.
17. I disagree with what the Army stands for (R).
18. You can be sure that Army procedures will be good, because they have been tried and tested.
19. School children should have plenty of discipline.

Subset 3. Freedom vs. regulation

20. People should be guided more by their feelings and less by the rules (R).
21. People should be made to be punctual.
22. Efficiency and speed are not as important as letting everyone have their say in making decisions (R).
23. There is far too much regimentation of people nowadays (R).
24. You know where you're going when you have an order to obey.
25. People should not be expected to conform as much as they are today (R).
26. People who say we can't have enough freedom here in Australia don't know what they're talking about.
27. I don't mind if other people decide what I am to do, or advise me how to do it.
28. It would be much better if we could do without politics altogether (R).

*All items are scored from 5 to 1, see footnote in Appendix B. Normed on 96 National Servicemen, alpha = .82. Items marked (R) are reverse scored.



1. In the Army soldiers should not obey an order if it is obviously morally wrong (R).
2. If the Army allowed more room for individuality, it might be a better institution (R).
3. People should be guided more by their feelings and less by the rules (R).
4. There is something wrong with anybody who likes to wear military uniform (R).
5. The armed forces are largely unnecessary (R).
6. You know where you're going when you have an order to obey.
7. My outlook could never become that of a soldier; I will always remain a civilian (R).
8. I could never feel really at home in the army (R).
9. On the whole the Army seems to be better than most places in civvy street.
10. The army turns boys into men.
11. The Army is very good for straightening men out and smartening them up.
12. I like wearing uniform.
13. The weapons training you get in the Army is a good thing to have.
14. Civilians could learn a lot from the Army.
15. People outside the Army shouldn't criticize it, because they don't know what it's like.
16. I now regard myself as a soldier.
17. People who knock the Army don't know what they're talking about.
18. You can be sure that Army procedures will be good, because they have been tried and tested.
19. When I wear a uniform I feel I have a duty to live up to the standards that others before me have set.
20. The Army is a great Australian organization.
21. I feel proud to be a digger.
22. Army standards have been built up over the years, and so they are very well worth living up to.
23. Anzac day is a bit of a joke (R).
24. There's nothing worse than hearing old soldiers talking about their experiences when they were young and in the Army (R).
25. Ceremonies are a stupid waste of time (R).
26. If I have to fight after I've finished my training, I think I'll do pretty well.
27. The thought of going to Vietnam to fight doesn't really worry me.
28. I often worry about the possibility of being wounded or killed in action (R).
29. A soldier must accept the possibility that he may be wounded or killed in action.
30. I am a soldier and I accept without question the possibility that I may be wounded or killed in action.
31. You wouldn't learn anything at all by fighting in Vietnam (R).
32. The Army has too much money spent on it (R).
33. The Army is very important to the community.
34. Regular soldiers are overpaid (R).
35. Most army personnel would have a pretty hard time getting as good a job
36. No one with any real drive or ambition would join the army (R).
37. The Army cares too much about rules and not enough about people (R).
38. The Army says everything we do is for a good reason, but many of the things we do seem pretty stupid and pointless to me (R).
39. The Army is unfair to those it doesn't like (R).
40. In the long run it would be in our best interest as a nation to spend less money for military defence and more money for education, housing, and other social improvements (R).

*Normed on 98 conscripts, alpha = .94. Items are scored from 5 to 1, see footnote in Appendix B. Items marked (R) are reverse scored. A large number of items in this scale were contributed by Jane Ross of the Department of Government at the University of Sydney.



1. I wouldn't like people to think I'm different.
2. I get embarrassed very easily.
3. Having lots of people who like you is the most important thing in life.
4. I feel very left out of it if I have to do something on my own.
5. If at first I thought something was wrong but then everyone else said it was OK, I would probably go along with them.
6. In general everyone in my family has much the same opinions on nearly everything.
7. Most of my friends have the same opinions as me.
8. Fitting in with other people and their opinions is about the most important thing in life if you want to be happy.
9. If someone in a group has a different opinion to all the others, it is pretty likely he will come to realize he was wrong.
10. To get along with people you have to share their views on most things.
11. What you hear and read from the radio, TV and newspapers is generally pretty sensible.
12. You should stick up for your friends if they're in trouble, even if it makes you a bit unpopular with other people (R).
13. You should stick up for your friends if they're in trouble, even if this means telling small lies.
14. It is very important to stick to your own ideas, even if this makes you unpopular (R).
15. It's wrong to be ambitious.
16. I don't want to be the same as other people (R).
17. People who don't want to talk about themselves probably have something to hide.
18. It's always important to fit in with your group, even if you don't always like what they stand for.
19. I wouldn't want to have hobbies or do things that the rest of my crowd don't do.
20. People shouldn't insist on "being different" if they know that this is going to worry the other people they mix with.
21. I am quite happy when I am on my own (R).
22. For a group leader a pleasing personality is more important than being good at the things the group has to do.
23. A person should live by the standards of those around him, rather than setting up his own personal standard.

*Normed on 96 National Servicemen, alpha = .86. Items marked (R) are reverse scored. All items in this scale were contributed by Jane Ross, Department of Government, University of Sydney.



1. I used to belong to several clubs.
2. I try to take my holidays always in a different place.
3. I enjoy meeting new people.
4. I feel more at ease among a group of men than in mixed company (R).
5. In general I find it easier to talk to older people than to those in my own age group (R).
6. At school I used to hang about with a group of friends.
7. Here in the camp I do not find it easy to mix and make friends (R).
8. All my friends come from much the same background as myself (R).
9. When I am with people of a different background from my own, I generally feel uncomfortable and out of place (R).
10. In the Army it is not so important to get along with people; you just have to do what you're told and keep out of trouble (R).
11. When I meet new people, I prefer it if they are all pretty much the same type of person as myself (R).
12. Looking back I'd say that I'd mixed with pretty well all sorts of people.
13. In general I would say I'm a pretty good mixer.
14. Before I came into the Army, I used to have quite a lot of contact with strangers.
15. When I was a kid, I only played with other kids who were from the same sort of background as me (R).
16. I enjoy mixing with people from different social backgrounds from my own.
17. Before I came into the Army, I never had much contact with strangers (R).
18. I am confident that I can mix pretty well with all sorts of people, even foreigners.

*Responses were scored from 5 to 1, see footnote of Appendix B. Normed on 98 conscripts, alpha = .80. Items marked (R) are reverse scored. Several items in this scale were contributed by Jane Ross.




1. In the long run, the best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.
2. A person who is extremely tolerant of widely different and even conflicting viewpoints probably has few opinions of his own.
3. It is only natural that a person will have a better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than the ideas he opposes.
4. Our thinking would be a lot better if we would just forget about words like "probably," "approximately," "perhaps."
5. I don't have much inclination to get to know people who hold views that are completely different to my own.
6. For most questions there is only one right answer once a person is able to get all the facts.
7. Although many details remain to be worked out, we now have definite answers to most practical problems in life.
8. Nobody ever learned anything really important except, through suffering.
9. Familiarity breeds contempt..


1. Allowing educated Asians to immigrate benefits Australian society (R).
2. The White-Australia policy is a good policy because it keeps Australia white.
3. We must be careful not to let too many Asians into the country or they'll take over the place.
4. Asians should be allowed to migrate to Australia (R).
5. The Japanese are a very productive people and should be allowed to settle in Australia (R).

Political Alienation

1. Politicians are generally dishonest and out for their own good.
2. Most of our politicians do a fine job and work hard for the people (R).
3. Sometimes I think that we should have a revolution and make a fresh start with everything.
4. Party politicians do what their financial supporters tell them, and none of them bothers much about what the people really need.
5. Compared with other countries I think we in Australia have one of the best governments in the world. (R).
6. It would be much better if we could do without politics altogether.
7. People like me don't have any part to play in politics in Australia, even if we wanted to.


1. We must always look for new solutions rather than be satisfied with how things are at the present time [b].
2. It is a duty to bring your children up properly.
3. Naturally those in top positions should have more pay and better conditions than those working beneath them.
4. When police are dealing with students and others who are demonstrating against the government, they are too rough with them (R).
5. If people disagree pretty strongly with what the government is doing, they have every right to disobey its laws (R).
6. The police should have much less power (R).

[a] Items marked (R) are reverse scored.
[b] Note that the first conservatism item is an anomalous one, i.e., although it was originally written to tap radicalism, it correlated positively with conservatism items and negatively with radicalism items. This is not as odd as it may seem. The apparent explanation is that it was taken by the respondents as reflecting a belief in "progress." That this is thoroughly consistent with historical conservatism is easy to confirm. A speech made in 1899 by Mr. Balfour, the British Conservative politician was reported (in part) as: "Mr. Balfour warned churchmen that their controversies were deeply moving to the country's mind and conscience. The strength and efficiency of the nations armaments were the best security for universal peace, and common sympathy between Great Britain and America was the surest guarantee of civilization, freedom, and progress." (In the Australian press this report appeared in the "Maitland Daily Mercury" of Feb. 1, 1899, under the heading "British Politics.")



Egalitarianism [b]

1. Children of rich graziers are no different from anyone else.
2. There should be an upper limit on income so that no one earns very much more than others.
3. Avoiding spending on luxuries is necessary to reduce the differences between social groups.
4. Differences in salaries should be reduced.
5. All men are equal.
6. There should be more chances of getting rich than there are now (R).
7. The country is run best by those who are brought up to it (R).
8. The government has the responsibility to see that nobody lives well when others are poor.
9. A decision should not be taken until all disagreements have been fully resolved.
10. Preserving harmony in the community should be considered more important than the achievement of community programs.
11. There should be no class distinctions.
12. Jack is as good as his master.
13. Even if given the chance, I would not have the background to help in running the country (R).
14. People from well-off families who've been to good schools will naturally make better leaders (R).
15. Those in top positions should have more pay and better conditions than those working beneath them (R).
16. In every situation poor people should be given more opportunities than rich people.

Army traditionality [c]

1. I feel proud to be a digger.
2. Army standards have been built up over the years, and so they are very well worth living up to.
3. When I wear a uniform I feel I have a duty to live up to the standards that others before me have set.
4. I feel proud to be part of an organization that has shaped Australia's destiny.
5. The Army is a great Australian organization.
6. There's nothing worse than hearing old soldiers talking about their experiences when they were young and in the Army (R).
7. Even though I had no part in it personally, I feel a glow of pride on Anzac Day. 8. Anzac Day is a bit of a joke (R).
9. Ceremonies are a stupid waste of time (R).
10. You can be sure that Army procedures will be good, because they have been tried and tested.
11. The Army can't get over its past (R).
12. There is too much emphasis on tradition in the Army (R).
13. There's something sacred about things which are old.

[a] Items marked (R) are reverse scored.
[b] Pretest reliability of the 16 items was .79.
[c] Pretest reliability of the 13 items was .85.


[1] I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Jenny Ross under whose aegis these data were collected.
[2] Taken from the newspaper Sydney "Truth" (Apr. 22, 1894, p. 1). It is a quotation from the tirade of a Sunday orator on Melbourne's Yarra Bank (analogous to London's Hyde Park).
[3] Speaking of declining enlistment rates for the Citizen's Military Forces he says: "There is little doubt that the CMF has become a victim of the times. Warlike peopl- are out of fashion. It had its highest volunteer intake in the `fifties' when ... people still liked uniforms" (The Australian, January 30, 1971, p. 21).
[4] Again I have to thank Jenny Ross for making this available. The sample consists of two entire consecutive intakes at the Kapooka training center.


Although Table 5 showed a .30 correlation between consevatism and anti-Asian sentiment among a group of conscripts, it should be noted from Table G that the conservatism scale concerned has some unusual features. It may also be worth noting that a fear of Asians ("The Yellow Peril") is traditional in Australia so what is true of attitude to Asians may not be true of attitudes to other ethnic groups.

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